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INSTITUTIONS AND
THE SECOND AMENDMENT
DARRELL A. H. MILLER†
ABSTRACT
District of Columbia v. Heller ruptured the one institution—the
militia—that courts had used for centuries to implement the right to
keep and bear arms. If the question was “what arms?,” one looked to
the militia to find an answer; if the question was “whose arms?,” again,
one looked to the militia. Heller loosened the fit between the militia and
the right, causing a welter of conflict as to what institutions now
facilitate and constrain the Second Amendment. This Article attempts
to restructure the inquiry into Second Amendment rights by drawing
from the literature on institutionalism and constitutional law.
Although the institutional turn in constitutional law has been
important to free speech scholarship, religion clause scholarship, and
separation of powers scholarship, no one has consciously applied
institutionalism to the Second Amendment. This Article fills that gap.
In so doing, it situates institutionalism within the leading
methodological approaches of today: textualism, originalism, common
law constitutionalism, popular constitutionalism, and pragmatism. As
such, this Article aims to reach beyond Second Amendment scholars
and speak more generally to debates about constitutional law and
constitutional theory.
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INTRODUCTION
We should consider institutionalizing the Second Amendment.
Whatever one thinks of District of Columbia v. Heller1 as a matter of
public policy, as a matter of constitutional law and theory, or as a
matter of principle, this much is certain: the old frameworks for
implementing the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense have
weakened and new frameworks must be built.
The Second Amendment contains two clauses. The first clause
reads: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State”; and the following clause reads: “the right of the people to

1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual rather than a collective right to keep and bear arms for selfdefense).
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keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.”2 For over two centuries,
courts held these clauses in a tight seal. Joining the two clauses fortified
the doctrine against the welter of conflicting, sometimes corrosive,
historical, political, and moral claims that tend to surround any
discussion of the right to keep and bear arms. If the question was “what
arms?,” one only had to look to the militia clause.3 If the question was
“whose arms?,” again, the militia clause supplied an answer.4 Outside
the courthouse, economists, politicians, and historians waged a
sometimes personal and acrimonious debate.5 But within the
courthouse, the Second Amendment as law (as distinguished from
rhetoric, politics, or faith) was calm, even arid. When the Supreme
Court loosened the fit between the militia and the right to keep and
bear arms6—whatever one may think of the correctness of its
conclusion—it caused an irreparable breach, into which poured all the
clamor and confusion of gun-rights talk.7
Now, existing forms of constitutional adjudication no longer hold.
Historical prohibitions do not mesh with their justifications.8 Gun-free
zones are criticized as the places guns are needed most.9 Weapons may

2. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (determining that a short-barreled
shotgun was not shown to bear “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia”).
4. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1886) (holding that a law that criminalized
persons who “associate together as military organizations, or . . . drill or parade with arms in cities
and towns unless authorized by law, do[es] not infringe the right of the people to keep and bear
arms”).
5. See, e.g., ALAN M. GOTTLIEB, THE GUN GRABBERS: WHO THEY ARE, HOW THEY
OPERATE, WHERE THEY GET THEIR MONEY (1998); BOWLING FOR COLUMBINE (United
Artists & Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2002). For a further discussion of the history, see generally
Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the Great American
Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 681 (2004).
6. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (noting “that modern developments have limited the degree of fit
between the prefatory clause and the protected right”).
7. See generally Joseph Blocher, Gun Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813 (2014) (surveying
the rhetoric and cultural roots of gun-rights proponents).
8. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 1343, 1353 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Robert J. Caldwell, The Lessons from Virginia Tech: Bloodbath in a ‘Gun-Free
Zone,’ SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Apr. 22, 2007), http://www.utsandiego.com/uniontrib/2007
0422/news_lz1e13caldwe.html [https://perma.cc/G96W-HDZQ]; Nick Wing, Dennis Baxley,
Florida GOP Lawmaker: End Gun-Free School Zones After Sandy Hook Massacre, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 17, 2012, 5:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/17/dennis-baxley-florida
_n_2318140.html [https://perma.cc/R26L-ECMK].
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be licensed when concealed, but not when displayed.10 Children not old
enough to serve in the militia argue that they enjoy a right to arm for
self-defense.11 The felons who are least likely to confront violence want
more gun rights than those felons who are most likely to confront
violence.12 Advocates claim that even private restrictions on the places
one can carry weapons amount to an assault on “Second Amendment
rights.”13
The law is in tumult, and the boundaries between political,
economic, historical, and legal argument are indistinct and
treacherous. Is evidence of the safety or dangerousness of a firearm
relevant to constitutional litigation?14 Does the historical fact of a
longstanding regulation on gunpowder matter?15 Are antityranny
concerns for keeping and bearing arms legal, political, or moral
arguments?16
We need a structure for the Second Amendment that can
distinguish between a public park and public housing, between a
Claymore sword and a Claymore mine. And we need a structure for
the Second Amendment that amounts to something more than seat-of10. Rani Molla, Map: Where Is ‘Open Carry’ Legal?, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 22, 2014, 4:14
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/map-where-is-open-carry-legal-1715 [https://perma.cc/7LNG
-GHFM].
11. People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 328–30 (Ill. 2013).
12. Compare United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We now join our
sister circuits in holding that application of the felon-in-possession prohibition to allegedly nonviolent felons like Pruess does not violate the Second Amendment.”), with United States v.
Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e recognize that [the federal felon-in-possession
statute] may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its disqualification
of all felons, including those who are non-violent . . . .”). For a further discussion of felon-inpossession laws, see generally C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009).
13. See Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43 n.216
(2012) (citing Louise Red Corn, NRA to Boycott Companies, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 2, 2005, at A9
(quoting National Rifle Association (NRA) chief executive Wayne LaPierre as threatening “to
make ConocoPhillips the example of what happens when a corporation takes away your Second
Amendment rights”)).
14. Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119, 1124–25 (N.D. Ill. 2012)
(disputing the relevance of empirical data); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of Social Cost,
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 951, 956–57 (2011).
15. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630, 632, 634 (2008).
16. See id. at 598 (“[W]hen the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and
organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.”). But see Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P.
Denning, How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Second Amendment: A Reply to Professor
Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 89, 93 (2013) (arguing that the Second Amendment does
not guarantee a right to overthrow the government).
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the-pants intuitions, unelaborated cost-benefit analysis, and historical
pastiche. We need to institutionalize the Second Amendment.
This Article explores an institutional approach to the right to keep
and bear arms. An institutional approach is one where officials, and
judges in particular, recognize and potentially defer to salient
organizations, rules, traditions, and norms that both facilitate and
constrain Second Amendment activity. An institutional approach
means more than judicial respect for context, as context alone does not
capture the mediating, decisionmaking, and constitutive functions of
institutions. Finally, this institutional turn is different from the old
collective versus individual rights debates of the last half century. It
accepts Heller’s holding as definitive, and calls for an evaluation and
recognition of the various institutions that will shape the doctrine going
forward.
This Article explains the need for an institutional approach after
Heller and identifies potentially relevant Second Amendment
institutions to shape the doctrine. But my ambitions are broader.
Although I discuss institutions relevant to the Second Amendment
context, the applications are general. Institutions exist. But their role
in constitutional construction remains undertheorized. Scholars of
executive power,17 First Amendment speech and religion,18 and racial
discrimination19 have made strides in institutional analysis within their
particular fields, but their insights have not been applied to the Second
Amendment, or across constitutional domains, despite the tendency of
judges to borrow from various sources.20 The Second Amendment
provides space to think about these problems because the scope of gun
rights is an unsettled area of law, but the insights here may prove useful
17. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual
Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 59–62 (2014); see also
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014) (“[F]or purposes of the Recess Appointments
Clause, the Senate is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the
capacity to transact Senate business.”).
18. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Religious Associations: Hosanna-Tabor and the
Instrumental Value of Religious Groups, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 73, 82–100 (2014); Joseph Blocher,
Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 847–83 (2008); see also Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707–08 (2012) (deferring to the
church to determine who is a “minister”).
19. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1, 15–26 (2006); Ian F. Haney López, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1757–1823 (2000).
20. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
462–82 (2010).
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to more than just Second Amendment scholars. Our constitution,
written and unwritten, contemplates many institutions—home, church,
school, city, corporation, and family—and our exploration of
institutions in the Second Amendment may generate models that will
feed back into other constitutional fields.21
Part I briefly summarizes Heller. It then explores Heller’s tacit
recognition of institutions in Second Amendment adjudication. First,
it explains how Heller’s limits on the Second Amendment are difficult
to reconcile with the “central component” of the right, self-defense. It
then shows how the Court’s conventional methodologies are
inadequate to address present and future questions about the Second
Amendment. This Part concludes by explaining how the Court has
demonstrated a sensitivity to institutions, a sensitivity that could help
to resolve these contradictions if used to implement the right. Part II
offers a working definition of an institution, drawing on the literature
that has developed in the past twenty years. Part III offers a series of
defenses of institutionalism in constitutional adjudication, and
considers how each may cash out with respect to Second Amendment
cases. Part IV provides a sampler of “Second Amendment
Institutions”: institutions that both facilitate and constrain Second
Amendment activity. Part V situates institutionalism within larger
debates about constitutional theory, explaining the relevance of
institutions to textualists, originalists, common law constitutionalists,
popular constitutionalists, and prudentialists. The Article concludes
with a sketch of what an institutional approach may mean for the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, and for the broader
project of constitutional adjudication.
I. HELLER: A BRIEF HISTORY
The Second Amendment states that “[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”22 In District of
Columbia v. Heller, the Court held for the first time that this
amendment protects the right of an individual law-abiding adult citizen
to possess an operable firearm, including a handgun, in his home for
21. See Randy J. Kozel, Institutional Autonomy and Constitutional Structure, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 957, 977 (2014) (discussing the broader potential of institutional analysis in constitutional
law).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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self-defense.23 Heller concerned a District of Columbia regulation that
placed severe restrictions on the ownership and transportation of
handguns and other firearms in the home, including a requirement that
firearms be locked or disassembled when not in use.24
Dick Heller, a special police officer for the Federal Judicial Center
and a gun-rights champion, sued the District in federal court alleging
that the regulation violated the Second Amendment. Among gunrights advocates, it was assumed that the Second Amendment
protected individual firearm ownership.25 Several state constitutions
expressly guaranteed an individual right to keep and bear arms,26 and
some lower courts and certain members of the Supreme Court had
signaled that the Second Amendment protected an individual right.27
But as a matter of constitutional doctrine, the right was far from
clear. The Court had not spoken on the topic since United States v.
Miller28 in 1939. In Miller, the Court rejected a claim that indictments
under the National Firearms Act of 1934 violated the right to keep and
bear arms.29 The defendants were charged with possessing a shortbarreled shotgun, a firearm deemed illegal under the Act.30 The
defendants had initially persuaded the lower court to quash the
indictment as a violation of the Second Amendment.31 But a
unanimous Supreme Court reversed. According to Justice
McReynolds, the Second Amendment “must be interpreted and
applied” with the end of maintaining a well-regulated militia.32 Because
the defendants had produced no evidence that possession of a short23. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008).
24. Id. at 574–75.
25. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller,
122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 207–13 (2008) (discussing the rise of the individual rights interpretation
of the Second Amendment).
26. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683,
686 n.11 (2007) (citing Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15
U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 59 n.2 (1989)) (identifying states with individual rights provisions prior
to Heller).
27. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 938 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(speculating on an individual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment); United States v.
Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264–65 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding an individual right to keep and bear arms
under the Second Amendment).
28. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
29. Id. at 176.
30. Id. at 175–76.
31. Id. at 177.
32. Id. at 178. Justice Douglas did not take part in the case. Id. at 183.
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barreled shotgun bore “some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,” they were not
entitled to any constitutional protection.33
The holding in Miller mentioned neither self-defense nor any
firearm uses independent of the militia. For nearly seventy years after
the decision, lower courts read Miller to endorse a militia-centric
Second Amendment.34 Miller itself seemed simply to follow decades of
militia-focused state-law precedent.35 Consequently, when Heller filed
his suit in 2003, the idea that the Second Amendment protected an
individual right to keep and bear arms was at best equivocal.36 Former
Chief Justice Warren Burger, speaking from retirement in the 1990s,
thought the individual-rights reading of the amendment was so
preposterous that it amounted to a “fraud.”37 In Heller, in 2008, the
Court held that the individual right to keep and bear arms was not a
fraud—it is the law.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Heller majority, revisited the
amendment’s text and broke it apart. The first clause—concerning “a
well regulated Militia”—is “prefatory”; the second clause—concerning
“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”—is “operative.”38 The
operative portion “unambiguously refer[s] to individual rights, not
‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through
participation in some corporate body.”39 The text is easily understood:

33. Id. at 178.
34. See, e.g., Quilici v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir.
1942).
35. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 182 n.3 (citing, inter alia, Fife v. State, 31 Ark. 455 (1876); City of
Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230 (1905)). For other militia-centered opinions, see generally Haile
v. State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 (1872).
36. For a discussion of the historiography of this debate from various ideological
perspectives, see generally Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment
Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2000); Patrick J. Charles, The Second
Amendment in Historiographical Crisis: Why the Supreme Court Must Reevaluate the
Embarrassing “Standard Model” Moving Forward, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1727 (2012); David T.
Hardy, The Rise and Demise of the “Collective Right” Interpretation of the Second Amendment,
59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315 (2011); Don B. Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second
Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1211 (2009).
37. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 25 (2011) (quoting Warren Burger).
38. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008).
39. Id. at 579.
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it preserves a right of individual “people” to “have” and “carry”
“weapons” for purposes of “confrontation.”40
Under the majority’s reading, the prefatory clause contemplates
an unorganized “citizens’ militia” comprised of “the people” who are
armed for confrontation.41 From this body of armed people, Congress
has “plenary” authority to form an “organize[d]” militia, such as the
National Guard.42 This unorganized militia is “a safeguard against
tyranny.”43 Fear that Congress may abuse its plenary power, according
to the Heller majority, explains why the amendment speaks in terms of
the militia. But the militia does not undermine the personal right; that
right is a preexisting “natural right of resistance and selfpreservation,”44 recognized by our English ancestors—a right that
forms “the central component” of the right to keep and bear arms.45
Of course, the majority assures us, the right is not for any person
to carry any weapon for any confrontation in any place that that person
happens to be.46 Heller and its sequel McDonald v. City of Chicago47
stipulate that the right only protects those weapons “typically
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”48 And even
then, nothing in the opinions “cast[s] doubt on such longstanding
regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.’”49
The Court indicates that this nonexhaustive list of limitations on
the Second Amendment has “historical justification[],”50 but does not
40. Id. at 581–92.
41. Id. at 579, 599.
42. Id. at 596.
43. Id. at 600.
44. Id. at 594 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144).
45. Id. at 599.
46. Id. at 595 (“[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to
carry arms for any sort of confrontation . . . .”); id. at 626 (“[T]he right was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”).
47. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2011). McDonald held that the right to keep
and bear arms applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 791.
48. Heller, 544 U.S. at 625.
49. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27).
50. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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explain what it means by a historical justification or how to identify
other “presumptively lawful” regulations.51 The Court also “expressly
reject[s]” tests for constitutionality that rely upon “judicial interest
balancing.”52 That balancing, according to the Heller majority, already
took place with the founding generation and cannot be repeated.53
II. SECOND AMENDMENT INTUITIONS
Heller states that self-defense—“the natural right of resistance and
self-preservation”54—is the “central component,” the “core” of the
Second Amendment.55 This is a peculiar turn for such a self-consciously
textualist opinion; self-defense was a term known to the Framers, and
they did not use it when drafting the amendment.56 If the original
meaning of the Second Amendment was to protect individual selfdefense, the manner in which the amendment expresses that
protection—by reference to a thing used for self-defense—is an odd
way to do it.57
Most of the Second Amendment’s drafting and discussion
centered upon the organization and control of the militia. The
individual-rights reading of the Second Amendment is more a product
of the nineteenth than the eighteenth century.58 It is more John
Bingham than James Madison.

51. Id. at 627 n.26; see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786.
52. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785.
53. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
54. Id. at 594 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *144).
55. Id. at 599, 629 (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. at 576 (“In interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he
Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’” (quoting United States v.
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))); id. at 642 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the omission of a
self-defense purpose in the text of the Second Amendment).
57. Odd, but not unprecedented: the right to criticize the government through publication
may be expressed through a First Amendment right to the “press.” See Michael W. McConnell,
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 416–19 (2013); Eugene
Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a Technology? From the Framing
to Today, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 459, 461–81 (2011).
58. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 326 (2005) (noting
the transition from militia-centered to individual-rights interpretation of the amendment); Saul
Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: The Intellectual
History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 746 (2013) (noting that Heller’s
reading of the Second Amendment comes “not from Founding-era sources or practices, but from
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But, having abandoned the militia as an organizing concept, Heller
needs something to keep the prefatory and operative clauses from
slipping out of joint. Heller maintains that the Second Amendment
contained a hitherto unacknowledged individual right at its ratification
in 1791.59 Enter self-defense. Heller uses self-defense to smooth the
spotty and pitted eighteenth-century record on an individual right to
bear arms with the thicker, more direct expression of an individual
right during Reconstruction.60 What emerges is a Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms that appears seamless, timeless, and
natural. But to do this, Justice Scalia must hoist the right to a level of
generality that earns his ire elsewhere,61 and very quickly his opinion
buckles under the strain.
“The natural right of resistance and self-preservation”: at that
stratospheric level of abstraction, there is no distinguishing between
threats from a tyrannical government, an invading army, rogue police
officers, or the common burglar.62 Inmates with homemade knives and
nations with nuclear weapons equally partake of a right to self-defense
at these heights.63 But the Constitution as law, rather than aspiration
or rhetoric, cannot long stay at this dizzying altitude. The surly
question: “What is to be done?” is constantly tugging at the opinion.
The response, “the natural right of . . . self-preservation” is not much

a set of legal rules elaborated by two nineteenth-century authors of legal treatises written over a
half a century after the Second Amendment was framed and adopted”).
59. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–77 (relating that the Second Amendment includes idiomatic
meaning and implicates what “ordinary citizens in the founding generation” would have known).
60. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional
Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 899–900 (discussing the more individual-rights focus of
the Second Amendment during Reconstruction).
61. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.)
(criticizing the dissent for failing to “refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified”).
62. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 93 (1992) (“Whether murder, rape, and theft be committed by gangs of assassins,
tyrannous officials and judges or pillaging soldiery was a mere detail . . . .”); David B. Kopel, The
Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1454 n.358 (“The Framers
. . . saw community defense against a criminal government as simply one end of a continuum that
began with personal defense against a lone criminal . . . .”).
63. Cf. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.”).
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of an answer.64 The “core” of the amendment may help bridge the
centuries, but it is too wispy to support judgments of who must go to
prison, and who must be set free.
The Justices agree. Despite occasional references to a brooding
omnipresence of natural law in the majority opinion,65 the right is “not
a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”66 The Justices in Heller and
McDonald may diverge on the limits to the Second Amendment, but
they all agree that a bare moral claim to self-defense does not vanquish
all regulation. In fact, Heller suggests that some kinds of arguments—
even when couched in the language of self-defense—are not Second
Amendment claims at all. The Court is clear that some categories of
“keeping,” “bearing,” and “arms” are not in fact Second Amendment
keeping, bearing, or arms, just as some kinds of speech (obscenity, true
threats) are not First Amendment speech.67
It seems intuitive (although it is not certain) that a prisoner may
defend himself from an attack in prison. But that prisoner has no right
to possess an “arm” to do so, whether that arm is a gun, a knife, or any
other type of contraband weapon.68 Prisoners who defend themselves
with homemade shanks are simply not exercising Second Amendment
64. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o raise a self-defense question is
not to answer it.”).
65. The reference is to Justice Holmes’s famous dissent in S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,
222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky,
but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign that can be identified.”). For more
on the “brooding omnipresence” critique of Heller, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive
Equality: A Perspective, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1, 26 (2011). For a discussion of natural law folded into
Heller’s reasoning, see Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79
FORDHAM L. REV. 1513, 1523–26 (2011).
66. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
67. Id. (suggesting that concealed carry is not a type of “bear[ing]” protected by the Second
Amendment). See generally Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009) (forecasting that the Court may have to
address the same categorical and balancing issues with respect to gun rights as it has with free
speech rights).
68. Compare McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (“Self-defense is a basic right,
recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present . . . .”), and Griffin v. Martin,
785 F.2d 1172, 1186 n.37 (4th Cir. 1986) (“It is difficult to the point of impossibility to imagine a
right in any state to abolish self defense altogether, thereby leaving one a Hobson’s choice of
almost certain death through violent attack now or statutorily mandated death through trial and
conviction of murder later.”), opinion withdrawn by 795 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1986), with Rowe v.
DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047, 1052 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e find no precedent establishing a constitutional
right of self-defense in the criminal law context.”), vacated, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 10069 (7th Cir.
1994).
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rights to “keep” or “bear” an “arm,” no matter how central selfdefense may be to the Second Amendment. Similarly, it seems
apparent that certain weapons, such as nuclear munitions, landmines,
and perhaps even powerful firearms such as “M–16 rifles and the
like,”69 may not be kept by civilians. These simply are not “arms” as
that word is used in the Second Amendment, no matter the
grammatical meaning of that word and irrespective of the utility of
these weapons for confrontation.
But these are just intuitions. We have instincts that a prison is
different from a house and that a machine-gun is different from a
shotgun. But ever since Heller ruptured the one institution used to
manage these distinctions, we have no structure to explain why these
differences are constitutionally relevant. All we have are intuitions that
the Second Amendment must operate differently in different contexts.
III. SECOND AMENDMENT BALANCING AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL TURN
The Court has not helped us move much beyond intuitions. The
majority blessed a nonexclusive set of pragmatic “presumptively
lawful” regulations, but left the details to future litigation.70 Although
these “presumptively lawful” regulations seem sensible, little in their
origin or their justification follows from the logic or method of Heller
and McDonald.71 Worse, the Heller majority and McDonald plurality
denigrate the one jurisprudential mechanism—balancing—that has
been the predominant method to address presumptions. Yet the Court
offers no analytical framework to replace balancing.72 Nevertheless,
the Court’s dictum shows sensitivity to the different places, persons,
and activities that may trigger Second Amendment scrutiny. This
sensitivity may form the basis for a more cohesive institutional
structure for the Second Amendment going forward.
Heller’s “sensitive places” exception to the Second Amendment
reveals the weakness of existing tools of constitutional analysis, but it
also hints at the Court’s receptiveness to an institutional approach. In
Heller, and then again in McDonald, the Court assures us that “nothing
69. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627.
70. Id. at 626.
71. See Lund, supra note 8, at 1353.
72. Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 855 (2013).
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in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions” such as “the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools.”73 That schools may ban guns is difficult to understand given
the Court’s stated purpose of the Second Amendment, which is to
protect a core right to keep and carry arms for confrontation. School
violence is a disheartening reality.74 Moreover, if gun-rights rhetoric is
true, the fact that the government can designate a school or any other
“sensitive place” a “gun-free zone” makes that place potentially more
hazardous.75 Gun-rights advocates insist “gun-free zones” are “victim
zones” and, in creating them, government does exactly what the
amendment forbids: it renders a person comparatively defenseless at a
time and place where she is most vulnerable.76
Conventional doctrinal methods cannot explain the Court’s
“sensitive places” dicta. Either they simply state the dicta as a
conclusion, or they rely on balancing tests that Heller and McDonald
seem to repudiate. Take, for instance, the most common form of
Second Amendment analysis to date: the mixed scope-plus-scrutiny
approach, partially drawn from First Amendment doctrine.77 The Fifth
Circuit says the first step requires the court “to determine whether the
challenged law impinges upon a right protected by the Second
Amendment—that is, whether the law regulates conduct that falls

73. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
74. ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (2016),
http://everytownresearch.org/documents/2015/04/analysis-of-school-shootings.pdf [https://perma.
cc/EG52-T739].
75. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The notion that ‘self-defense has to take place
wherever [a] person happens to be’ . . . portend[s] all sorts of litigation over schools, airports,
parks, public thoroughfares, and various additional government facilities.” (first alteration in
original) (quoting Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for SelfDefense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1515
(2009))).
76. See, e.g., S. 2011, 76th Sess., at 3 (Nev. 2011) (statement of Sen. John J. Lee) (“Nevada
colleges and universities are labeled ‘gun free zones.’ I argue these zones are ‘defenseless-victim
zones.’”); Caldwell, supra note 9; John R. Lott, Did Colorado Shooter Single Out Cinemark
Theater Because It Banned Guns?, FOX NEWS (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/
2012/09/10/did-colorado-shooter-single-out-cinemark-theater.html [https://perma.cc/9UZF2BTW].
77. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e are persuaded to adopt the two-step framework [for the
Second Amendment] outlined above because First Amendment doctrine informs it.”); United
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (looking to First Amendment doctrine for
guidance).
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within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”78 Framing
the question narrowly—is there a right to take a gun to school for selfdefense?—puts the rabbit in the hat. The Court has already said that
gun-free school zones are presumptively lawful, akin to felon-inpossession laws. If the Court’s list of presumptively lawful regulations
supplies an answer rather than an analysis, then the response to the
question is always “no.” Framing the question by reference to the
“core” of the right—self-defense—is equally unhelpful. If the question
is—could there be a need to defend oneself in a school?—the answer
is always “yes.” But, at this level of generality, “yes” is always the right
answer: whether we speak of a school, a church, a saloon, or a
courtroom.
Assuming the regulation or activity falls within the scope of the
amendment—here, a gun-free zone—the second step of the test
requires the court “to determine whether the law survives the proper
level of scrutiny.”79 If self-defense is a natural right codified in the
Second Amendment, and if any regulation that makes self-defense
with a firearm harder to accomplish thereby implicates that right, then
every regulation is subject to some heightened level of scrutiny.
At risk of oversimplification, there are two levels of heightened
scrutiny: strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.80 Strict scrutiny
requires that the regulation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest.81 Accordingly, strict scrutiny will usually
invalidate the regulation.82 A ban on guns in sensitive places infringes
the right. Even if one stipulated that the government designated the
place sensitive for a compelling reason (whether that reason was to
78. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d at 194.
79. Id.
80. There is plenty of academic commentary suggesting that, in practice, the three-tiered
structure of constitutional scrutiny—rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny—has
weakened, if not completely disintegrated. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter:
A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1727 (2005) (suggesting the “doctrinal structure
is coming apart” and citing cases); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L.
REV. 1447, 1450 (2004) (noting the sexual orientation cases have undermined tiers-of-scrutiny
analysis).
81. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 582 (2001).
82. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment) (calling conventional strict scrutiny “strict in theory, but fatal in fact”). But see
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1668–69, 1673 (2015) (upholding nonsolicitation rule
in judicial campaigns under strict scrutiny); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40
(2010) (upholding material-support-for-terrorism statute against First Amendment challenge
under strict scrutiny).
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avoid mayhem or accidents, or to protect the police or the citizenry), it
would never be narrowly tailored because scofflaws will never obey the
gun-free zone (or any other regulation) and only the law-abiding
citizen will be burdened. Accordingly, there would nearly always be a
less restrictive method to advance the government interest.83
Intermediate scrutiny, by contrast, may preserve a regulation on
guns in sensitive places, but for reasons that appear arbitrary or
idiosyncratic. First, the intermediate scrutiny standard is unstable even
at the level of its articulation. Some courts state that the regulation
must be “substantially related to an important government objective”;84
other courts say that the regulation needs to be “reasonably adapted to
a substantial governmental interest.”85 Some courts separately evaluate
whether there are less restrictive or less burdensome methods of
advancing the stated goal;86 some courts require that the regulation go
no further than what is “essential” to the goal;87 and some require no
such inquiry at all.88 Second, even when courts agree on how to
formulate the test, they diverge on how to assess what counts as a
“substantial relationship” or a “reasonable” adaptation. And third, this
method of scrutiny does not explain why the government’s substantial
interest in preventing armed mayhem is less weighty when regulating a
public park or a city sidewalk, than when regulating a school or a
government building.

83. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Were we to require
strict scrutiny in circumstances such as those presented here, we would likely foreclose an
extraordinary number of regulatory measures, thus handcuffing lawmakers’ ability to ‘prevent[]
armed mayhem’ in public places.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614
F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 2010))); Heller v. District of Columbia, 45 F. Supp. 3d 35, 54 (D.D.C. 2014)
(“According to Plaintiffs . . . municipalities should be limited to enacting only those firearms
regulations that lawbreakers will obey—a curious argument that would render practically any gun
laws unconstitutional.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
84. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (emphasis added).
85. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471 (emphasis added); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (looking
for a “reasonable fit between the law and an important government objective”).
86. See Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 478 (1989) (“We uphold
such restrictions so long as they are ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve a significant governmental
interest . . . a standard that we have not interpreted to require elimination of all less restrictive
alternatives.” (citations omitted)).
87. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
88. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 553 (4th
ed. 2011) (calling “less restrictive alternative analysis” an “unresolved question” in intermediate
scrutiny, and collecting cases).
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Intermediate scrutiny assumes that preventing armed mayhem is
an important government objective. If we cannot stipulate to the
legitimacy of the government interest, the test becomes even more
unpredictable. With other areas of constitutional law, we have at least
a modicum of agreement about the evils we want to smoke out:
invidious or subordinating classifications in equal protection suits, for
example, or content and viewpoint regulation in First Amendment
cases. But in Second Amendment litigation, we still lack a basic
consensus on how to distinguish a government evil from a government
function.89 Certainly universal citizen disarmament is an evil, but few
seriously advocate ignoring Heller and beginning confiscation. If every
regulation inevitably tilts toward the abyss of universal disarmament,
it is hard to figure out how any regulation is constitutional.90
Further, some government purposes directly conflict with Heller’s
stated reasons for the right. Laws that protect police from firearms also
protect tyrants from firearms; laws denying guns to the mentally ill also
deprive them of an effective means of self-protection. Frequently,
intermediate scrutiny seems to produce judgments preordained by the
judge’s assessment of the relative merits of the policy.91 As a result, a
handful of judges have rejected intermediate scrutiny as illegitimate
Third Branch tinkering.92
The only rationale Heller offers for the constitutionality of gunfree zones is the assertion that these regulations are “longstanding.”93
“Longstanding” could mean a number of things. It could mean any
regulation that existed in 1791. Perhaps there were prohibitions on
firearms in schools in 1791, but no one has identified any to date. It
could mean regulations that meet a certain threshold of longevity, even
if there is no precise example from 1791. Some states regulated guns in

89. Cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 56 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not
a tort for government to govern . . . .”).
90. See Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 363 (1985) (discussing
slippery slopes as depending on a set of empirical assumptions).
91. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 301 (1992) (remarking on intermediate scrutiny’s “shifting
bottom line”).
92. See Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J.,
dissenting), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2012); Heller v.
District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting); Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
93. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
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schools in the mid- to late 1800s,94 although no one has investigated
how common the regulations were, or how often they were enforced—
assuming “longstanding” also means “widespread” and “not
desuetudenal.”95 Even then, that historical evidence would only
account for schools. The inside of a commercial airliner feels like a
sensitive place, even though Congress did not regulate guns on planes
until 1961.96
It could be that prohibitions are longstanding when they resemble
other types of historical regulations. The Court applies similar
reasoning with jury-trial rights.97 But the Court did not specify in Heller
how similar such a regulation must be,98 and has offered only oblique
guidance since.99 Further, even if we accept some Burkean notion that
longevity equals constitutionality in Second Amendment cases,100
much of the constitutional canon is built upon the ruins of longstanding
regulations.101 Finally, Heller may not require that the regulation be
longstanding so long as some other justification applies.102 But
94. See infra Part V.D.
95. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Second Amendment Traditionalism and Desuetude, GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2016). Compare Charles, supra note 36, at 1799–1821 (challenging
historian Joyce Lee Malcolm’s claim that public carry regulations were not enforced in England
in the seventeenth century), with JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 104–05 (1996) (arguing that gun laws in England were
seldom enforced and unpopular in the seventeenth century).
96. Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-197, 75 Stat. 466.
97. See generally Miller, supra note 72, at 872 (concluding that “the Court has fashioned a
test that relies primarily on historical analogues to determine the kinds of suits that trigger a jurytrial right and the constitutionality of procedural innovations that control the jury”).
98. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, 634 (dismissing gunpowder storage and a single Boston regulation
as immaterial to the constitutionality of the District of Columbia regulation).
99. Cf. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1027 (2016) (reiterating that “the Second
Amendment extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the founding”
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 582)).
100. Cf. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) (“The Court’s
inquiry . . . must be to determine whether the prayer practice in the town of Greece fits within the
tradition long followed in Congress and the state legislatures.”).
101. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015) (striking down bans on
same-sex marriage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking down antimiscegenation
laws).
102. There is some adjectival slip between Heller and McDonald. It is not clear from Heller
that the “longstanding” description is meant to apply to any restriction except those concerning
felons and the mentally ill. McDonald uses the adjective to cover all categories of regulations. The
full passage from Heller reads as follows:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope
of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,
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justifications based upon an express cost-benefit analysis or other kinds
of weighing must reckon with the skepticism of balancing expressed in
Heller and McDonald, as already discussed.
An institutional approach to the Second Amendment could give
some content to what makes a school a “sensitive place.” But more
broadly, it could structure the inquiry into why any set of regulations
or protections is contemplated by the Second Amendment. When
Heller says an arm is protected because it is in “common use” or is
“typically” used for purposes like self-defense and hunting, the Court
appears to appeal to some kind of social practice as constitutive of the
Second Amendment.103 The same can be said of “longstanding
regulations.” Presumably, then, social practice, tradition, norms, and
values are thought to shape the Second Amendment right, in a way that
is loosened from—but not completely independent of—a cost-benefit
analysis or other consequentialist considerations. Put another way, it
seems as if the Court understands the Second Amendment not to
encode some abstracted, naked natural right to self-defense or a
calcified set of historically-delineated regulations, but instead to permit
the legal evaluation and management of a number of concurring or
conflicting cultural practices, behaviors, values, and institutional
arrangements.104
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: DEFINITIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
The Court has confirmed a strong intuition that the Second
Amendment is shaped by institutions. The problem is not that this
intuition is wrong. The problem is that the Court has not supplied a
theory to build this intuition into constitutional doctrine, told us how
to identify other unstated institutions that influence the Second
Amendment, or explained how these institutions map onto other
or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27; see also Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle
over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 715 n.64. (2012) (noting this
ambiguity).
103. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577, 627; see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447,
449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (mem.) (“Heller asks whether the
law bans types of firearms commonly used for a lawful purpose.”).
104. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 487–96 (2011) (discussing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as managing an
equilibrium of police practice versus privacy set at some point in the past).
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constitutional doctrines and methods of constitutional adjudication.105
This Part outlines a working definition of institutions and provides a
series of normative justifications for institutional sensitivity in
constitutional law. The subsequent Part identifies a few institutions
salient to the Second Amendment, although the list is by no means
exhaustive.
A. What Is an Institution?
Institutions could provide some structure to contain and
administer the otherwise broad rights proposed in Heller’s headier
passages. Before I address that set of issues, some definitional work is
required. What do I mean by an institution?106 For my purposes,
institutions are rules, norms, practices, conventions, and perceptions
that are durable, relatively stable, intelligible, and communicable (both
within and between generations), and that can variously facilitate or
constrain behavior, coordinate action, delegate or allocate
decisionmaking authority, create or maintain identity, intermediate
between groups and between individuals and the state, or constitute
social reality.107
105. See Kozel, supra note 21, at 962 (explaining that the “sweet spot” of institutionalism is
“greater sensitivity to the unique factual realities that characterize certain institutions, coupled
with increased transparency about the relevance of those realities to constitutional
adjudication”).
106. The term “institution” is often used, but seldom fixed. In fact, one challenge to a more
systematic institutional approach to constitutional law has been the multiple definitions of the
term “institution.” See Michael R. Siebecker, Building a “New Institutional” Approach to
Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247, 286 (2008) (noting the “significant barrier” placed on
institutional analysis by disagreement as to basic definitions); see also Daniel H. Cole, The
Varieties of Comparative Institutional Analysis, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 383, 388 (“Despite the fact that
institutional analysis (comparative or otherwise) has been with us for a very long
time . . . surprisingly little agreement exists on the meaning of that rather ordinary-seeming
term.”).
107. In crafting this definition, I draw upon the work of a number of institutional scholars.
For example, James March and Johan Olsen state that institutions are “a relatively enduring
collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that
are relatively invariant in the face of turnover.” James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Elaborating
the “New Institutionalism,” in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 3, 3
(R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder & Bert A. Rockman eds., 2006). Elinor Ostrom defines
institutions as “sets of working rules . . . [that] determine who is eligible to make decisions in some
arena, what actions are allowed or constrained . . . what procedures must be followed, what
information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned” and that “contain
prescriptions that forbid, permit, or require some action or outcome.” ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 51
(1990). Paul Horwitz and Isaiah Berlin both recognize the identity-forming role of institutions.
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Although social context informs institutions, social context alone
does not exhaust my definition of an institution. Institutions,
depending on their salience, may, as described above, intermediate,
determine, delegate, or constitute in ways not fully captured by the
brute fact that a hotel is different from a hospital and both are different
from a home.108 Schools are an example of this distinction: schools are
not just “where a certain kind of person—a child—happens to be,”109
schools are institutions because of a set of conventions, rules, and
norms that make the concept of a “school” socially meaningful.110
An institution also differs from an organization.111 Many
organizations are institutions, but not all institutions are organizations.
To modify slightly Frederick Schauer’s example: hitting a ball with a
bat is a phenomenon, baseball is an institution, and Major League
Baseball is both an institution and an organization.112 An institution
also differs from a momentary, or even frequent, set of individual
preference-maximizing exchanges between atomized, autonomous,
rational actors.113 An institution, as I use the term, contemplates a
“collection of structures, rules, and standard operating procedures”
See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 76 (2013); ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, 118, 154–56 (1971). John Searle and John
Rawls discuss institutions and their constitutive work. See JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SOCIAL REALITY 27–30 (1995); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 24
(1955). Jacob Levy describes the intermediating function of institutions. See JACOB T. LEVY,
RATIONALISM, PLURALISM & FREEDOM 1 (2015).
108. See HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 97. For a discussion of the difference between “brute
fact” and “institutional fact,” see generally SEARLE, supra note 107.
109. Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 286 (2008); cf. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 (1934) (“Any family is an institution. Any family is made up
of persons. But not every aggregation of persons is a family.”).
110. Garnett, supra note 109, at 286; see also Richard Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:
Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 739–41 (1998)
(discussing schools as a particular type of institution).
111. See Ronald L. Jepperson, Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism, in THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 143, 144 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991); Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L. REV.
1837, 1865 n.87 (2010).
112. Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1747, 1752 (2007) (describing baseball as an institution as opposed to an “artifact”); see also
SEARLE, supra note 107, at 110–12 (using baseball to distinguish phenomena from institutions).
113. See March & Olsen, supra note 107, at 4 (“Institutions are not simply equilibrium
contracts among self-seeking, calculating individual actors . . . .”); Rawls, supra note 107, at 24
(“[A] practice necessarily involves the abdication of full liberty to act on utilitarian and prudential
grounds.”).
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that “are carriers of identities and roles,” that empower as well as
constrain human agency, and play “a partly autonomous role in
political life.”114 To paraphrase Douglass North: “Institutions are the
rules of the game that survive even when the players change.”115
Institutions carve up the Constitution.116 In some areas they are
salient. The Senate holds trials for impeachment and confirms judicial
nominees.117 Congress may provide for an army.118 We hold elections.119
We empanel juries.120 These concepts grow diffuse and contested at the
margins, but where one can find some measure of terminological
consensus, one can find an institution.121
In other areas, institutions are neither systematized nor
acknowledged. For many years, the First Amendment right to free
speech (expressly identified as a model for Second Amendment
doctrine122) was one such area. As Frederick Schauer has written, the
Court has historically professed blindness to institutional differences in
First Amendment cases.123 The Court treats the press, despite its
textual prominence, not as an institution but as “simply . . . another
speaker.”124 The Court holds the First Amendment to protect “certain
behaviors . . . regardless of the actor” and to prohibit certain
“government actions . . . regardless of the . . . target.”125 The test for

114. See Jepperson, supra note 111, at 144; Llewellyn, supra note 109, at 17 (“An institution
is in first instance a set of ways of living and doing.”); March & Olsen, supra note 107, at 4.
115. Thanks to an anonymous Yale Law student for this pithy summary. See, e.g., DOUGLASS
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1 (1990)
(“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society . . . .”).
116. See Schauer, supra note 112, at 1747 (“Law carves up the world.”).
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. II, § 2.
118. Id. art. I, § 8; Jepperson, supra note 111, at 144 (identifying the army as an institution).
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; Jepperson, supra note 111, at 144.
120. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
121. Cf. Jepperson, supra note 111, at 146 (“In systems, cores are institutions relative to
peripheries.”).
122. See Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 53 (2012).
123. Schauer, supra note 112, at 1754 (describing First Amendment doctrine as
“institutionally blind”). But see generally HORWITZ, supra note 107 (discussing the manner in
which First Amendment doctrine uses institutions in unacknowledged ways).
124. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1257,
1257 (2005).
125. Id. at 1261.
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obscenity under the First Amendment is the same whether the medium
of communication is a public theater or a smartphone application.126
Institutions, like other constitutional concepts, can be described
through metaphors of density. We can speak of thick institutions,
thinner institutions, and thin institutions.127 An institution is thick when
its existence is specified in the text, and its rules, customs, and norms
are highly stable and observable. This stability and transparency may
arise because the institution uses formal mechanisms for change or rule
making, or it can arise through a long and documented history. Thick
institutions are especially resistant to change. Congress is one such
institution. It is textually specified, it has many traditions and rules, and
it has been present in American society and governance since the
Founding.128 Thinner institutions are not necessarily specified in the
constitutional text, but constitute the myriad presuppositions of
political and social life that judges occasionally elaborate upon.129 The
Department of Defense, the IRS, the police, cities, universities, and
corporations are examples of thinner institutions.
But an institution does not require even this level of organization.
Habituated, repeated, reproduced cultural behaviors and assumptions
can also be institutions.130 These thinnest types of institutions are those
explored by legal scholars such as Ian Haney López and political
scientists in the “New Institutionalist” school,131 and by philosophers
such as John Searle and John Rawls.132 These institutions are the

126. See id. But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 561 (1969) (treating obscenity in the
home differently than obscenity in public).
127. For example, Mark Tushnet has distinguished between the “thick” portions of the
Constitution that deal with organizational details about the federal government, and “thin”
constitutional provisions that reflect “deep [theoretical and political] commitments, [that
are] . . . truly basic to the Constitution” and are more subject to popular debate and discussion.
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1506–08 (2009); see also Jack
M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 644–46 (2013)
(using these metaphors to describe theories of original semantic meaning); cf. Mitchell N.
Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 6, 12–13 (2009) (describing “hard” or “deep”
originalism as compared to “soft” or “shallow” originalism).
128. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2569 (2014) (discussing the Senate’s
“institutional” resources).
129. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1817–18
(2012).
130. See SEARLE, supra note 107, at 4 (describing some aspects of institutions as “weightless
and invisible” and “tak[en] . . . for granted”).
131. See López, supra note 19, at 1769–84.
132. See SEARLE, supra note 107, at 27–30; Rawls, supra note 107, at 24.
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“scripts” and “paths” that shape choice and social reality.133 Although
these institutions may exhibit only minimal or no organization, they
can nevertheless become entrenched. Courtesy is an example of a thin
institution,134 as is money and promise keeping.135 These concepts are
not meaningful without a prior institution to supply that meaning.136
The more an institution exhibits “taken for grantedness,”137
unconscious reproduction, or reinforcement “through reference to
natural or spiritual law,” the more resistant it is to alteration.138
Institutions divide, but do not always isolate. Institutions interact
with each other. Sometimes they complement each other, sometimes
they conflict with each other, sometimes they nest within each other;
but it is rare, if not impossible, for an institution to remain sequestered
from the web of working rules, norms, assumptions, and customs of
daily life.139 As Stephen Elkin has reminded us, institutions are
“patterns of behavior, or practices, [that] are interconnected; what we
can and ought to do about one set of practices has strong implications
for what happens or ought to happen elsewhere in the politicaleconomic order.”140
B. Why Institutions?
Institutions are social facts, but so what? Why have legal reality
follow social reality, rather than the other way around?141 In response,
scholars offer a number of reasons for judges to recognize or defer to

133. See López, supra note 19, at 1782.
134. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 47 (1986) (discussing “the institution of
courtesy”).
135. See SEARLE, supra note 107, at 32 (identifying money and promising as examples).
136. See, e.g., John R. Searle, How to Derive “Ought” from “Is,” 73 PHIL. REV. 43, 54 (1964)
(“[A] man has five dollars, given the institution of money. Take away the institution and all he
has is a rectangular bit of paper with green ink on it.”).
137. Jepperson, supra note 111, at 152; see also SEARLE, supra note 107, at 4 (describing some
aspects of institutions as “weightless and invisible” and “tak[en] . . . for granted”).
138. Jepperson, supra note 111, at 152; see also March & Olsen, supra note 107, at 7 (“Rules
are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate.”).
139. See Stephen L. Elkin, The Constitutional Theory of the Commercial Republic, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1933, 1943–44 (2001); Jepperson, supra note 111, at 152; see also HORWITZ,
supra note 107, at 234 (speaking of “nested” institutions).
140. Elkin, supra note 139, at 1944; Llewellyn, supra note 109, at 18 (institutions, like the
Constitution, “embrace[] the interlocking ways and attitudes of different groups and classes
within the community”).
141. See HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 68.
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an institution when they address a constitutional problem. None of
these reasons are exclusive, and many are reinforcing.142
An institution may have expertise and knowledge, or the capacity
to assemble expertise or knowledge, unavailable to other decision
makers (like judges). For constitutionally specified institutions, like
Congress, this kind of advantage is apparent. Congress can commission
studies, hold hearings, and summon experts. This does not mean that
these technocratic efforts go unsullied by politics, but it is undeniable
that a legislature has resources at its disposal that dwarf those of other
agents.143
Another reason is that institutions may provide the best allocation
of authority in the absence of clarity. In an ideal world, a benevolent
dictator would supply costless tailoring of legal rules and norms to
create optimal outcomes. But because we do not live in an ideal world,
deference to institutions is the best alternative.144
Institutions, born of practice, tend to be bottom-up rather than
top-down. Consequently, law may follow institutions in that
institutions are more democratically legitimate than judicial dictates.145
Certainly this applies to legislatures, but it may also apply to various
other organizations and institutions for which the options of loyalty,
exit, and voice are effective.146
Relatedly, institutions may foster civic republican values that are
more difficult to generate through hierarchical mandates. As de
Tocqueville famously put it, “the free institutions of the United
States . . . provide a thousand continual reminders to every citizen that
142. Special thanks to Matt Adler for helping me formulate this crisp summary.
143. See Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178–79 (2001) (discussing resource advantages of
Congress versus courts).
144. See Rawls, supra note 107, at 24 (discussing how, because it is impossible to accurately
predict everyone’s behavior, practices develop to coordinate behavior); see also Adrian
Vermeule, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123
HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (2009) (identifying in James Madison’s Federalist 51 the assumption that “the
best second best [constitutional design] is to ensure an array of institutions, each of which
promotes its own institutional ambitions”).
145. See Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY,
POLITICS, AND LAW (1988)) (“The tradition of this political community cannot accept the
proposition that the elite make better decisions than the people, or that popular institutions are
inferior to electorally unaccountable ones.”).
146. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (discussing these concepts).
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he lives in society. . . . By dint of working for the good of his fellow
citizens, he in the end acquires a habit and taste for serving them.”147
People may feel more invested in a community theater staffed by
volunteers and supported by subscriptions than one run by civil-service
employees and maintained through taxation.
Although it seems contradictory, a person’s identity and selfdirection may depend upon his participation in an institution.148 Many
people define themselves by reference to their church membership,
their alumni status, their profession, or their hobbies.
Finally, institutions may be the product of incomplete agreements
about certain values or meanings. In this sense, an institution, like a
constitutional text, may serve a coordinating function.149 Relatedly, the
legal salience of an institution may reflect hard-won political
settlements that should be renegotiated only with good cause.150 A
university, for example, coordinates the educational function of a
community and enjoys a certain deference with respect to its internal
workings, including discriminating based on the content or viewpoint
of speech,151 using race in admissions,152 and compelling payment for
speech—even when that university is a public entity.153
In sum, law may take cognizance of institutions for a number of
reasons. Some or all of these reasons may come into play as the courts
continue to adjudicate Second Amendment suits. Criminological
147. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 26 (7th ed. 2009) (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Doubleday 1969) (1835));
see also HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 221.
148. HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 221; Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s
Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 235, 237 (1998) (speaking of the self-realizing powers of organizations like corporations).
149. Rawls, supra note 107, at 24 (stating that institutions coordinate behavior because
accurately predicting everyone’s behavior is not possible). See infra Part VI.D.
150. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1742–44 (1995) (discussing the “important virtue” of achieving “convergence on particular
disputes without resolving large-scale issues of the right or the good”).
151. Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 831 (1993) (“Initial
hirings, tenure, and promotion all involve subject matter restrictions, and in practice viewpoint
discrimination as well.”).
152. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) (“Considerable deference
is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics, like student body diversity, that
are central to its identity and educational mission.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340–41
(2003).
153. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000)
(upholding mandatory “activity fee”); see HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 120–28.
AND
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experts, sportsmen, or police unions may have epistemic advantages
concerning the hazards and benefits of certain types of firearms or
ammunition. A believer in markets as first-best distributors of coercive
power may defer to the preferences of various institutions (churches,
gun clubs, schools) as the way to achieve the optimal mix of gun rights
and restrictions. The ideal amount of deference, autonomy, or even
“sovereignty” that law should accord to institutions I leave to others.154
My aims for this Article are more modest—they are: first, to show that
as Second Amendment jurisprudence matures, transparency about and
sensitivity to institutions could help the doctrine avoid hazards that
threaten other constitutional areas, and second, to identify some of the
institutions that could be relevant to such a jurisprudence.
V. A SAMPLER OF SECOND AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS
As a provisional definition, a Second Amendment institution is an
institution that facilitates or constrains Second Amendment activity,
and in particular, its core feature of self-defense. Although this Article
focuses on Second Amendment institutions, it is likely that many of
these institutions overlap with other constitutional provisions, and so
there may be institutions that facilitate and constrain more than one
constitutional right. For example, a church, a mosque, or a home is
clearly a First Amendment institution, but it also may be thought of as
a Second Amendment,155 a Fourth Amendment,156 or a Fourteenth
Amendment157 institution. This overlap is a feature of all institutional
analysis, because the boundaries of institutions are informed by social
practice, not dictated by the lawyer’s needs.158

154. See HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 177–84 (discussing “sphere sovereignty” for
institutions); Kozel, supra note 21, at 963 (“[A]n institutional focus does not necessarily imply the
need for institutional autonomy.”).
155. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264–66 (11th Cir. 2012)
(discussing concealed-carry rules in churches).
156. See Fazaga v. FBI, 885 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“A reasonable officer
knows that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s home, office, and in certain
discrete areas of a mosque . . . .”); United States v. Hubbard, 493 F. Supp. 209, 213 (D.D.C. 1979)
(“[T]he searches plainly involved the plaintiff’s fourth amendment rights: the Church of
Scientology was the owner and operator of the premises and the party challenging the searches.”).
157. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (stating that a private school
operated under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church facilitates fundamental “liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children” and that a compulsory
public school law violated the Constitution).
158. See HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 68–72.
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What follows is a sampler because these examples do not exhaust
the number of institutions that may facilitate or constrain Second
Amendment activity. I do, however, think these examples offer a range
of salient institutions relevant to the right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense, and about which judges could be more attentive and
transparent.159 How courts may address the sometimes-coordinating,
sometimes-conflicting institutions and constitutional rights presented
here is beyond the scope of this Article. It seems apparent, however,
that the choice of constitutional methodology identified in Part VI may
affect which institutions a court chooses to recognize as well as how
much that institution may shape, constrain, or facilitate the various
rights claims that arise in litigation.
A. The Militia
The Heller Court did not render the militia redundant.160 The
prefatory clause of the Second Amendment, “[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State [,]” is still in place. In
fact, Heller invoked the institutional features of the militia numerous
times to explain why the eighteenth-century understanding protected
an individual right. Under Heller’s reading of history, citizens are
members of an unorganized militia, an institution different from the
official state militias, which constitute the various states’ National
Guards.161 Why is this significant? Because it helps to give institutional
context to personal firearm possession and use.162 Although personal
firearms are not wholly militia related, they are still somewhat related
to a “well regulated Militia” and to the “security of a free State.”
Consequently, those firearms most suitable for use in an organized
militia may be subject to more regulation than those that are suitable
purely for personal self-defense and only incidentally for the militia.
Authorities designated to supervise the organized militia could help
identify those features.

159. See id. at 81 (discussing the need for transparency).
160. Magarian, supra note 122, at 77 (noting that it is implausible that the militia clause was
read out of the Second Amendment).
161. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599–600 (2008) (discussing the “peoples’
militia” or “citizens’ militia” as distinct from the “organized militia”).
162. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion
Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
1285, 1308 (2013) (stating that the unorganized militia’s “constitutional pedigree [was] established
in Heller” and asking “whether certain types of guns serve that interest more than others”).
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Institutional sensitivity to the militia can help us decide what the
term “well regulated” means and does.163 In Heller, the Court
suggested that “well regulated” simply means the imposition of
“proper discipline and training.”164 But the distinction between
“proper discipline and training,” as opposed to impermissible
regulation, is contextual. Evidence of the scope of proper training,
storage, and safety for firearms in the context of the organized militia
can help us understand what kinds of regulations government can
impose upon members of the unorganized militia.
The militia can also help us understand who can assert a personal
right to keep and bear arms as a member of this institution. Certainly,
the militia is not the whole of the “people.”165 Nor does it protect
noncitizens the same as citizens, despite the fact that McDonald
incorporated the Second Amendment through the Due Process Clause
rather than the Privileges or Immunities Clause.166 Because one
purpose of the Second Amendment is to protect firearms personally
held by persons who are members of an unorganized militia, the
government has some discretion in specifying who can be members of
that unorganized militia. Laws can keep criminals, the mentally ill,
minors, and noncitizens from owning firearms (as distinguished from
exercising their right to self-defense) because of the government’s
interest in regulating this unorganized militia.
It also suggests an important scalability to the right to keep and
bear arms. In Marsh v. Alabama,167 the Supreme Court held that
private parties become subject to constitutional constraints when they
take on key attributes of an institution we call the city.168 So too, private
claims to be able to assemble private arsenals and security details mean
that these private entities become like the institution of the militia, and

163. United States v. Zaleski, 489 F. App’x 474, 475 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting the argument
that a member of the “unorganized militia” is entitled to privately possess machine guns).
164. Heller, 554 U.S. at 597.
165. Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145,
167 (2008).
166. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758 (2010). The Due Process Clause protects
“person[s],” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects
“citizens,” id. art. IV, § 2, cl.1.
167. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
168. Id. at 507–09.
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subject themselves to the constitutionally specified regulatory
authority of the state and federal government.169
To demonstrate, consider the following hypothetical: It is 1963,
and Governor George Wallace, like Orval Faubus, John Patterson, and
Ross Barnett, defies federal orders to integrate segregated educational
institutions. But instead of calling out the organized militia, as other
governors had done, Wallace follows through with a plan to summon
members of the unorganized militia to resist integration.170 Leagues of
otherwise law-abiding citizens assemble at the schoolhouse door with
personal arms at the behest of Wallace to resist integration. Is there
any reason to think the president could not federalize this group of
citizen soldiers to enforce integration, just as the president had done
with the National Guard in Arkansas? And if these members of the
citizens’ militia had disobeyed lawful orders or deserted, wouldn’t they
have been subject to courts martial just as if they were members of an
organized militia?171 At a minimum, it would seem that individuals who
style themselves as public peace officers owe some duty, care, and
obedience to the public commensurate with that role. Further, as
discussed more below, the institution of the militia can also help us to
understand how the right to keep and bear arms may be different in
the context of public policing, as opposed to private self-defense.
B. The Home
The home is an institution that has long shaped the right to arm
for self-defense.172 Although not textually specified in the Second
Amendment, the history of self-defense and firearms has centered on

169. See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 954–57 (2011).
170. There is no doubt that this unorganized militia exists. Heller points to its existence as
supporting a personal right to arms and 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(2) identifies it as “members of the
militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.” 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(2)
(2012). For a discussion of Wallace’s plans to use such a militia, see DAN T. CARTER, THE
POLITICS OF RAGE 113 (2d ed. 2000). See also H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The
Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403,
546 (2000) (discussing the militia’s history and the distinction between an organized and
unorganized militia).
171. See 10 U.S.C. § 802; 53A AM. JUR. 2D MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENSE § 242 (2006).
172. See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278 (2009) (making this argument).
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confrontation within the home.173 The result is to give institutional
shape to what the naked right to “bear” arms for “self-preservation”
can mean.
Although the Second Amendment does not mention the home,
there is an ancient cultural and constitutional recognition of the home
as a special place of refuge and sanctuary. Whether that institutional
sensitivity is represented through the Third or Fourth Amendment
text,174 through due process protections of property, privacy, or
family,175 or through the increased protections in the home for (and
from) speech,176 the home is salient in constitutional jurisprudence.
Anglo-American common law and culture has long recognized the
home as an institution that maximizes self-defense and autonomy. For
example, even though English law generally disarmed Catholics in the
seventeenth century, they were permitted to keep arms in their homes
necessary for self-defense as allowed by the Justices of the Peace.177
Confederate officers, freshly defeated by Union troops, could take
their private side-arms home.178 And the common law has long
recognized the “castle doctrine” which provides that no one must flee
from his home before using force against an intruder in self-defense.179
Early proposed regulations on the carrying of weapons during the
colonial era recognized the home as a demarcation. One bill made it a
crime for poachers to carry arms outside one’s own property unless
performing military duty.180 During Reconstruction, Congress’s source

173. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (focusing the Second
Amendment inquiry on self-defense in the home).
174. U.S. CONST. amends. III, IV.
175. See id. amends. V, XIV; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965).
176. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54–59 (1994) (observing a difference between the
government interest in regulating signage in public streets as opposed to homes); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (concluding that obscene materials are constitutionally
protected in the home); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487–88 (1988) (upholding an
ordinance that prohibited picketing outside an individual’s residence).
177. Miller, supra note 172, at 1324.
178. See MATTHEW S. MUEHLBAUER & DAVID J. ULBRICH, WAYS OF WAR: AMERICAN
MILITARY HISTORY FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 247 (2013).
179. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914).
180. The bill stated:
[W]ithin twelve months after the date of the recognizance he shall bear a gun out of his
inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty, it shall be deemed a breach of
the recognizance, and be good cause to bind him a new, and every such bearing of a
gun shall be a breach of the new recognizance.
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of indignation was that the Ku Klux Klan was breaking into freedmen’s
homes and disarming them,181 not necessarily that the government
regulation forbade whites and blacks alike from publicly bearing
arms.182
Judicial sensitivity to the home as an institutional focus of the
Second Amendment is not itself an answer to the question of whether
the right is home-bound. However, to the extent that the judiciary must
maintain a certain configuration of institutional arrangements, as
opposed to merely maximizing self-defense or minimizing armed
mayhem, a focus on the institutional aspects of the home does nudge
the judiciary along a more productive line of analysis.
In litigation, courts may continue to ensure the home is a unique
setting for facilitating Second Amendment activity. This may lead to
increased justifications for regulations that interfere with selfdefensive protections in the home and correspondingly lesser
protections for activity outside the home. One result? Weapons that
are uniquely capable of safely protecting homes may enjoy more
constitutional protection than weapons that are less suitable for home
protection.
C. The City
We have strong intuitions that carrying an arm through
Manhattan is different from carrying an arm through the Adirondacks.
As with the division between the home and the public, the division
between the city and the country is a demarcation justified by history
and consequentialist considerations.183
In the thirteenth century, regulations forbade all but certain
designated people from carrying arms in the city of London after
curfew.184 The fifteenth-century law was more general, and forbade
Alan Gura, Briefing the Second Amendment Before the Supreme Court, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 225, 245
(2009) (quoting A Bill for Preservation of Deer (1785), in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 443–
44 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)); see Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home:
Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1701 (2012).
181. Miller, supra note 172, at 1331.
182. Id. at 1335.
183. For a full discussion of the urban/rural divide on gun regulation, see generally Joseph
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82 (2013).
184. See Statutes for the City of London 1285, 13 Edw. 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF
THE REALM 102 (London 1810) (making it unlawful to go “about the Streets of the City, after
Curfew tolled . . . with Sword or Buckler, or other Arms for doing Mischief . . . nor . . . in any
other Manner, unless he be a great Man or other lawful Person of good repute”). For these
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“any man of whatsoever estate or condition to go armed within the city
and suburbs,” with the exception of certain elites, such as “lords,
knights and esquires” who were allowed a single sword.185 Blackstone
traced this prohibition back to ancient Athens, where “every Athenian
was finable who walked about the city in armour.”186
This institutional constraint upon the right to keep and bear arms
persisted into the nineteenth century, with Arizona forbidding certain
weapons such as knives and pistols “within any settlement, town,
village or city.”187 The Idaho territorial government went further,
prohibiting all weapons from being carried in the city except those
carried by law enforcement or active “officers or employees of any
express company.”188
These historical citations imply that the law has long respected a
divide between the city and the country with respect to firearms. The
sources of this distinction may be consequentialist; it is more dangerous
for a greater number of people for gun battles to rage in densely
populated areas.189 But even if we put aside the consequentialist
justification for the distinction, as with the home, if one of the purposes
of constitutional law is to preserve a certain set of institutional
arrangements, then courts should be permitted to maintain a
distinction between arms in the city and arms in the country,
irrespective of data concerning the likelihood of harm.
D. The School, the University, and the Church
The Court has shown (although it has not always acknowledged)
that it considers schools, universities, and churches as important

historical citations, I consulted a compilation: Mark Anthony Frassetto, Firearms and Weapons
Legislation up to the Early Twentieth Century (Jan. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2200991 [https://perma.cc/NJ39-BNPX].
185. 3 CALENDAR OF THE CLOSE ROLLS, HENRY IV, at 485 (Jan. 30, 1409, Westminster)
(A.E. Stamp ed., 1931) (quoted in Frassetto, supra note 184, at 16).
186. Blocher, supra note 183, at 113 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*148–49).
187. An Act Defining and Punishing Certain Offenses Against the Public Peace, No. 13, § 1,
1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws 30, 30 (West) (quoted in Frassetto, supra note 184, at 25).
188. An Act Regulating the Use and Carrying of Deadly Weapons in Idaho Territory, § 1,
1888 Idaho Sess. Laws 23, 23 (West) (quoted in Frassetto, supra note 184, at 26).
189. See Blocher, supra note 183, at 99–100 (“[T]he vast majority of gun control regulations
in the United States are local, and are tailored to the particular risks of gun use in densely
populated areas.”).
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institutional actors in First Amendment cases.190 Courts routinely,
though not invariably, defer to school officials, university
administrators, and pastors about how best to organize and discipline
membership.191 It may well treat these institutions similarly with
respect to Second Amendment claims as well.
Historical sources recognize the special institutional status of
these entities with respect to firearms. The Sir John Knight’s Case192 in
England, for example, involved a prosecution under the Statute of
Northampton for the carrying of a weapon into a church.193 In the
nineteenth century, Texas also prohibited the carrying of weapons
“into any church or religious assembly, any schoolroom or other place
where persons are assembled for educational, literary, or scientific
purposes.”194 Oklahoma had an almost identical provision,195 as did the
City of Huntsville, Missouri.196 Georgia also criminalized the carrying
of weapons in “any place of public worship.”197 (Although, a hundred
190. See HORWITZ, supra note 107, at 140–43, 175–77 (discussing schools, universities, and
churches as institutional actors); see also Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 207 (Ky. 1913)
(observing that a university, “its officers and students, are a legal entity, as much so as any
family”).
191. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012) (finding a ministerial exception to employment discrimination suits); Christian Legal
Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 697 (2010) (finding a public law
school’s policy of requiring student groups to accept “all comers” did not violate the First
Amendment); Oller v. Roussel, No. 6:11-CV-02207, 2014 WL 4204836, at *6–7 (W.D. La. Aug.
22, 2014) (finding no violation of tenured professor’s free speech rights for reassignments due to
his promotion of creationism and vaccine-autism link).
192. Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75 (KB).
193. See id. at 76. Knight was acquitted, but that says little about the validity of the law itself.
See Charles, supra note 36, at 1831–33 (discussing Sir John Knight’s Case).
194. An Act Regulating the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, Art. 6511, in 2 A DIGEST OF THE
LAWS OF TEXAS: CONTAINING LAWS IN FORCE, AND THE REPEALED LAWS ON WHICH RIGHTS
REST 1322, 1322 (3d ed. 1873).
195. WILL T. LITTLE, L.G. PITMAN & R.J. BARKER, THE STATUTES OF OKLAHOMA: 1890, at
496 (Guthrie, Okla., The State Capital Printing Co. 1891) (listing Art. 47, § 7, which prohibited
“any person, except a peace officer” from bearing any offensive or defensive weapon in “any
church or religious assembly, any school room or other place where persons are assembled for
public worship, for amusement, or for educational or scientific purposes”).
196. An Ordinance in Relation to Carrying Deadly Weapons, § 1, in THE REVISED
ORDINANCES OF THE CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, MISSOURI 58 (Huntsville, Mo., Herald Print 1894)
(prohibiting any person, except police officers or those with good cause, to go armed “into any
church or place where people have assembled for religious worship, or into any school room or
place where people are assembled for educational, literary or social purposes”).
197. An Act to Preserve the Peace and Harmony of the People of this State, and for Other
Purposes, 1870, § 1, in PUBLIC LAWS, PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA, AT THE SESSION OF 1870, at 42 (Atlanta, New Era Printing Establishment 1870).

MILLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/21/2016 3:17 PM

2016] INSTITUTIONS AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT

103

years before, Georgia had required individuals to bring guns to
church.)198
In a recent case, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a regulation
prohibiting firearms from being taken into churches, because “the preexisting right codified in the Second Amendment does not include
protection for a right to carry a firearm in a place of worship against
the owner’s wishes.”199 And numerous state universities and colleges
have voiced concern that allowing armed students onto campus will
change the learning environment for all students. Some administrators’
concerns have been respected,200 and some ignored.201
What this evidence shows is that, irrespective of the effect these
policies have on safety, something about how the institution
understands its own character is changed by the presence of firearms.202
An institutional approach to the Second Amendment would defer to
the institution’s assertion that the presence of firearms alters its
identity, and would not focus solely upon the issue of whether the
presence of arms actually makes the students or congregants more or
less safe.

198. An Act for the Better Security of the Inhabitants, by Obliging the Male White Persons
to Carry Fire Arms to Places of Public Worship, 1770, § 1, in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF GEORGIA 157 (Phila., Pa., R. Aitken 1800).
199. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 (11th Cir. 2012). The court rested
its decision on a background of private property, trespass, and criminal law, although it
emphasized throughout that this was a case involving a “place of worship.” Whether it would have
been different if it had been a hotel or restaurant is an issue explored in a recent work. See Joseph
Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and
the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 314 (2016).
200. Marc Lacey, Arizona Governor Rejects Bid to Loosen Gun Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/us/19arizona.html [https://perma.cc/MP9K-CMFC]
(reporting on the Governor’s veto of a bill that would have permitted guns on college campuses).
201. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031 (West 2016) (allowing firearms onto Texas
campuses); see also Betsy Z. Russell, Otter Signs Guns-on-Campus Bill into Law, SPOKESMANREVIEW (Mar. 12, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/mar/12/otter-signsguns-campus-bill-law [https://perma.cc/J6JY-47MV] (reporting that Idaho’s governor signed a
bill permitting guns on campuses).
202. Cf. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (“The forced inclusion of an
unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the
presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private
viewpoints.”); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos. Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573–
75 (1995) (discussing the First Amendment’s protection of the speaker’s right to “choose the
content of his own message”).
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E. Shooting, Sporting, and Gun-Rights Organizations
Guns are popular—intensely so in some circles. As Reva Siegel
has documented, the social activism of gun-rights advocates helped
overturn over two centuries of scholarly neglect and turn the Second
Amendment from a militia-centered right into an individual one.203 No
theory of Second Amendment institutions can disregard this powerful
social force. Organizations like the National Rifle Association (NRA)
and its allies expend a lot of time and energy shaping the cultural
meaning of firearms and arm bearing.204
In Second Amendment adjudication, gun organizations can
provide data to give meaning to “common use” with respect to the
definition of an “arm.” They can and do provide minimum standards
of training for state-licensed concealed carry,205 and counsel gun
owners on best practices concerning gun storage and safety. To the
extent that membership in gun organizations helps form a gun-rightsholder identity, that too is significant, especially when a court must
evaluate the need for spaces in which gun owners can associate,
exchange information, or practice shooting.206
Pro-gun organizations like the NRA are just one type of
institution among many, however. They may be more vocal, but their
values and concerns are no more or less important than the values and
traditions of institutions dedicated to religious worship, nonviolent
protest, free and uninhibited exchange of ideas, or racial equality— all
of which are of equal dignity in determining the scope and application
of Second Amendment rights under an institutional approach.
F. Police, Policing, and Public Carry
Public policing is an institution as well. The professionalized police
force is approximately 150 years old. Before that, policing was less
organized, but no less institutional. Policing was a sociological

203. Siegel, supra note 25, at 208–12.
204. See MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 90–98 (2014)
(discussing efforts of the NRA and allies to change perceptions of the Second Amendment).
205. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 (2014) (identifying the NRA as an approved trainer
for concealed weapons permits).
206. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708–09 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that a ban on gun
ranges within city limits when practice at ranges is required for handgun ownership violates the
Second Amendment).
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phenomenon, “a community affair”207 governed by a set of customs,
behaviors, rules, and norms that empowered individuals and
constrained behavior. For example, private individuals were (and in
some jurisdictions, continue to be) authorized to arrest anyone seen or
suspected of having committed a felony.208 Rotating details of
community watchmen were supposed to raise a “hue and cry” in cases
of danger, to which male community members were obliged to
respond.209
The suggestion that publicly armed persons are behaving in some
public manner, for some public purpose, extends from English history
to the American nineteenth century. In the seventeenth century, an
English statute generally prohibited the carrying of arms, except when
assisting law enforcement or “upon the Hue-and-cry ma[d]e to keep
the peace.”210 Arizona’s regulations on public arms did not extend to
“a person in actual service as a militiaman, nor as a peace officer or
policeman, or person summoned to his aid, nor to a revenue or other
civil officer engaged in the discharge of official duty.”211 At the very
least, these examples demonstrate that publicly carrying arms by
private parties has for many centuries been tied to the conduct of
government business, or to the specific or temporary institution of
peacekeeping.
G. Self-Defense
Even the prototypical encounter in a dark alley with an aggressor
can be understood from an institutional perspective. It may seem
strange to talk of individual self-defense as an institution. We often
conceive of self-defense as something natural and reflexive. As
Nicholas Johnson put it, “[i]f a psychopath kicks down my door,
207. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1197 (1999).
208. Id. at 1197 (“The earliest manuals and treatises on the subject, written in the seventeenth
century, drew no sharp distinction between the powers of constables and those of what were
already called ‘private persons’: both could arrest individuals ‘probably suspected of felonies,’ but
only if a felony had in fact been committed.” (quoting Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of
Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 567–80 (1936))); see also id. at 1184–85 & n.85
(citing jurisdictions in which private citizens may still arrest offenders).
209. Id. at 1197.
210. Charles, supra note 36, at 1835 (quoting JOSEPH KEBLE, AN ASSISTANCE TO THE
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR THE EASIER PERFORMANCE OF THEIR DUTY 646 (London, W.
Rawlins, S. Roycroft & H. Sawbridge 1689)).
211. An Act Defining and Punishing Certain Offenses Against the Public Peace, no. 13, § 2,
1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws 30, 30 (emphasis added) (quoted in Frassetto, supra note 184, at 25).
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nothing [a government may] say or do will keep me from going at him
with something heavy or sharp.”212 But the idea that self-defense is
natural and reflexive, that it is somehow beyond the law, unshaped by
convention, habit, or custom, is one feature of an institution that
conceals itself “through reference to natural or spiritual law.”213 It is to
fall into the naturalistic fallacy—the assumption that what people do is
what they should do.
Two historical facts challenge the natural-law and naturalistic
conception of self-defense. First, the nonviolent civil rights movement
of the 1960s repudiated the “naturalness” of self-defense. As
Jepperson has written, institutions are exposed when someone takes
“action” against the institution. The person who refuses to shake hands
exposes the institution of courtesy.214 The person who turns the other
cheek, even in the face of brutality, exposes the institution of selfdefense.215
Second, the notion of a pre-political, irreducible, inalienable, and
legally (as distinct from morally) cognizable “right” to self-defense is
not altogether certain. There is evidence that self-defense at common
law required supplication to and pardon from the sovereign, although
that pardon eventually became routine.216 The principle behind such
formalities was that “the first business of a ruler is the elimination of
all forms of self-help.”217 One criminal law theorist has argued that selfdefense is an institution enmeshed with the state; self-defense is only
justified (as opposed to excused, like an accident) because the person
is performing a “delegated state function” in the absence of a

212.
213.
214.
215.

Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 187, 194 (2006).
Jepperson, supra note 111, at 152.
Id. at 148.
See WESLEY C. HOGAN, MANY MINDS, ONE HEART: SNCC’S DREAM FOR A NEW
AMERICA 24 (2013) (discussing the training of sit-in activists to not strike back when attacked);
see also Matthew 5:39 (King James) (“But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever
shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.”).
216. See Bernard Brown, Self-Defence in Homicide from Strict Liability to Complete
Exculpation, in CRIM. L. REV. 583, 584 (John Burke & Peter Allsop eds., 1958) (“[I]n the
thirteenth century, he who killed by misadventure or in self-defence, ‘deserved but needed a
pardon.’”); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 692 (1975) (“At early common law only
those homicides committed in the enforcement of justice were considered justifiable; all others
were deemed unlawful . . . .”); Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV.
L. REV. 567, 575 (1902) (noting the ancient distinction between “justifiable and unjustifiable
homicides . . . [was] between cases of execution of the law and cases of private defense”).
217. Brown, supra note 216, at 583.
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government official.218 And therefore, although the brute fact of
striking another to prevent injury may be considered natural or
reflexive, self-defense can be understood as socially constructed, just
like marriage, family, or any other institution.
What this analysis suggests is that when advocates claim that they
are simply exercising a natural, inalienable, individual right to carry
arms for self-defense, they are tapping into an institution. The
institution can change over time, in that it can become more inclusive
or shrink or merge into another institution, but to call it natural is to
conceal the institutionalized character of the activity. Once the
institutionalized nature of self-defense is recognized and accepted, that
institution is placed on a similar footing with hosts of other
institutions—religious worship, deliberative democracy, education,
child rearing, entertainment—that judges may recognize and must
reconcile.
VI. INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Commentators celebrate Heller as profoundly originalist, but its
eclecticism lies just beneath the surface. Textualism,219 originalism,220
common law constitutionalism,221 popular constitutionalism,222 and
prudentialism223 all teem uneasily, and unacknowledged, within the
passages of Heller, its cousin McDonald, and in the numerous lowercourt opinions that have followed.
The Justices may settle on a Second Amendment test that reflects
one particular methodology, or (more likely) they will continue to

218. See Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L.J. 1070, 1127
(2008).
219. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (“In interpreting this text, we are
guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.’” (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))).
220. Id. at 576–77 (stating that the meaning of text determined by knowledge of “ordinary
citizens in the founding generation”).
221. Id. at 582 (“Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those
arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not
interpret constitutional rights that way.”).
222. Id. at 629 (“[H]andguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for selfdefense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”).
223. Id. at 626–27 (recognizing the validity of regulations prohibiting possession of “firearms
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings”).
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generate methodologically pluralist opinions. Either way, institutions
likely will influence outcomes. Institutions are inescapable social facts:
constitutional methodologies will simply identify and defer to different
institutions to different degrees and with more or less transparency.
This Part explores how institutions may influence constitutional
adjudication no matter the methodology or combination of
methodologies the courts choose to employ.
A. Institutions and Textualism
Textualism focuses on the meaning of words—in this case, the
words of the Constitution. Textualism promises clarity and
objectivity.224 But words are frequently unclear even when a text is
written in one sitting, much less when written over a span of two
hundred years.
Words can be unclear in a number of ways. They can be
ambiguous, in that they can have more than one meaning. For example,
“bright” can mean “intelligent” or “luminous.” They can be vague, in
that they admit a range of applications for which there is no generally
agreed-upon measurement or point of reference; words like “bald” or
“short” are vague.225 Words can be “open textured”: something in the
surrounding context has happened which makes a once-clear word
unclear.226 And words can be unclear because the same word is used in
different places and at different times, although the text purports to be
an integrated whole.227

224. James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97
VA. L. REV. 1523, 1525–26 (2011).
225. For prior use of some of these examples and for a discussion of these concepts, see
generally Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109
(2008); and Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 469–70 (2013).
226. Schauer, supra note 225, at 1124–32. Another way to think of “open texture” is the
irreducible risk of ambiguity or vagueness inherent in the fact that language exists through time.
See id. at 1126 (“Waismann’s valuable addition . . . was the conclusion that it is impossible to
eliminate the potential for vagueness in even nonvague terms, and this is the phenomenon he
called ‘open texture.’”). A goldfinch that suddenly exploded is the chestnut that beggars
description in this literature (can we still call it a goldfinch?). See id. at 1127 (discussing J.L.
Austin’s “exploding goldfinch” hypothetical).
227. To borrow Lawrence Lessig’s example, an Englishman who creates a bequest to “provide
scholarships for public schools” and then permits his American descendants to amend it to
“provide equipment and scholarships for public schools,” generates uncertainty as to what is
meant by “public schools.” “Public school” to the English means a private school, whereas it
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Institutions can provide “contextual enrichment” for unclear
terms. Contextual enrichment is the clarification that context gives to
semantic meaning, especially if the semantic meaning is
underdeterminate.228 For example, no contextual enrichment is
necessary to make the phrase “two Senators” intelligible.229 There is
little to be added in deferring to the opinion of The International
Mathematical Union concerning the word “two.” By contrast,
maritime institutions may better grasp the meaning of the words “high
seas”230 or “Tonnage”231 than nonmaritime institutions. Similarly, the
professional bar is perhaps better able to assess the meaning of the
word “speedy” in the Speedy Trial Clause, or economists to evaluate
what is “excessive” in the Excessive Fines Clause.
Of course, other textual specifications may alter or even foreclose
an institutional contribution to meaning.232 Historians observe that
treason at common law included killing one’s husband;233 smallgovernment populists lambaste the Affordable Care Act as treason.234
But the text of the Constitution belies both of these contextual
enrichments, because treason “shall consist only in levying War against
[the United States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort.”235
Finally, a judge who defers to institutions about communicative
content does not necessarily defer with respect to the legal effect.
Linguists, political scientists, and historians could determine what a
“republican form of government” meant in 1791, 1868, or at some other
fixed point, but that does not guarantee that judges will enforce those
means government-financed school to Americans. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (1993).
228. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
1935, 1939.
229. See Ryan, supra note 224, at 1526 (“The Constitution says clearly . . . that each state shall
have two Senators.”).
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
231. Id. art. I. § 10.
232. See Solum, supra note 225, at 466 (“Contextual enrichment can be cancelled by explicit
statement.”).
233. 4 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 659 (Charles E. Torcia, ed., 15th ed. 1996).
234. See Josh Israel & Adam Peck, Mississippi Tea Party Chairman Calls for Open Rebellion
Against Federal Government After Obamacare Ruling, THINK PROGRESS (June 29, 2012, 4:15
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2012/06/29/509010/tea-party-obamacare-rebellion [https://
perma.cc/P8NQ-J3CH] (quoting the remarks of a Mississippi Tea Party leader).
235. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see Solum, supra note 225, at 466 (“Contextual enrichment can
be cancelled by explicit statement.”).
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words as law.236 Such restraint is the basis of the political question
doctrine, for example.
The Second Amendment uses vague terms like “well regulated,”
ambiguous terms like “infringed,” and open-textured terms like
“Arms.” The amendment also poses intratextual challenges: “the
people” in the Second Amendment could mean “law-abiding
citizens,”237 or it could mean “a class of persons who . . . have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with [the United States] to be
considered part of th[e] community,”238 as it does in the Fourth
Amendment.
In sorting through how to read these words, judges may resort to
various institutions for guidance. They may look to sociologists,
psychologists, or civic organizations to decide when a class of persons
has developed a “sufficient connection” with the United States. As
discussed above, if “well regulated” is still influential in Second
Amendment adjudication, courts may defer to military officials to
evaluate the constitutional minimum for appropriate “discipline and
training.” “Arms” could simply mean weapons239—but that sweeps in
rocket launchers and anthrax—and so courts are likely to look to
institutions—police departments, hunters, and pistol clubs—for textual
guidance as to what kinds of “Arms” are commonly used for lawful
purposes.

236. 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3534.1, at 727–28 (3d ed. 2008) (“[I]t has been well established that
political questions are presented by challenges . . . grounded on the constitutional mandate in
Article IV, § 4, that the United States shall guarantee every state a ‘Republican Form of
Government.’”); see also Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). Chief Justice Taney
noted that:
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to decide what government
is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a
republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is
established in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not.
Id.
237. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008).
238. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(plurality opinion).
239. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (“[T]he most natural reading of ‘keep Arms’ in the Second
Amendment is to ‘have weapons.’”).
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B. Institutions and Originalism
Originalism is now more properly described as a “family of
theories,” rather than one theory.240 “Old originalism” concerned itself
with intentions: at first, those of the Framers—Madison, Hamilton, and
Jefferson (even though Jefferson was not at the Convention241)—and
later, those of the ratifiers.242 Old originalism succumbed to crippling
public-choice and democratic-legitimacy problems, giving rise to “new
originalism.” New originalism is less concerned with the subjective
intentions of identifiable speakers than the objective understandings
among a community of speakers. What keeps originalism distinct as a
family, at least according to some scholars, is its “fixation” thesis.243
Either the intentions or words or meanings (or all three) are fixed at
some point in the past, and (for most originalists anyway) that fixation
constrains judicial review.
Because new originalism focuses on demonstrable linguistic
meaning, it resembles textualism. What distinguishes new originalism
from textualism is fixation. Nothing about textualism requires fixation
by the linguistic habits of all English speakers at a certain point in time.
The relevant linguistic community could have lived in 1791, 1868, 1937,
1954, 2016, or across those times. The community could be composed
entirely of lawyers244 or mariners.245 The linguistic community could
include the enslaved,246 foreign nations,247 or women.248 It could be an
amalgam of all these communities. New originalism tends to substitute

240. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 225, at 526.
241. Jefferson is included in many lists of Framers, although he attended neither the
Philadelphia convention nor the ratifying conventions. See David Thomas Konig, Thomas
Jefferson’s Armed Citizenry and the Republican Militia, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 250, 253 (2008).
242. Solum, supra note 225, at 526.
243. Solum, supra note 225, at 459, 526–28; Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical
Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 378 (2013).
244. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 765 & n.51
(2009).
245. See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of maritime
institutions in interpreting nautical terms in the Constitution.
246. Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves Author the Thirteenth Amendment?: An Essay in
Redemptive History, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 471, 472–77 (1993).
247. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (discussing international opinions with
respect to cruel and unusual punishment).
248. See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2011).
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a fictive reasonable speaker of English for these communities,249 but
nothing about the exercise requires this fiction.
Originalism typically presumes that the legal content of words
flows directly from the fixed meaning. Hence, two Senators from each
state leads to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional to sit three
Senators.250 But, as Lawrence Solum has observed, the
underdeterminate nature of language, even if lexically fixed by a group
of speakers at some point in the past, gives rise to choices about legal
effect. “Excessive,” “cruel and unusual,” and “unreasonable” are
vague and ambiguous terms whether one consults an eighteenth
century dictionary or a modern one.251 Consequently, judges must use
other tools to administer the legal content of underdeterminate words.
Those tools could be varied, including extra- or subconstitutional texts,
precedent, stare decisis, judicial restraint, economic efficiency,
libertarianism, structure, or default rules.252
Again, this is where institutions may play a role. The Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness differs depending on whether
the search takes place in a home, a phone booth, or an automobile. It
matters whether the search is performed by a police officer or a highschool football coach.253 As discussed above, the Second Amendment’s
words are ambiguous, vague, or open textured, even if one assumes
that the communicative content of the words was fixed in 1791. Where
some (but not all) originalists may part company with more dynamic
theorists is with respect to their willingness to defer to
noncontemporaneous institutions in constructing legal rules.254 For
example, an originalist may allow state universities to ban firearms
from campus because universities did so in 1791, or, at a higher level of
abstraction, because of a tradition of universities acting in loco
249. See Solum, supra note 225, at 464.
250. Id. at 469 (using this example).
251. See id. at 469–72.
252. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3–93 (1982) (discussing different
modalities of constitutional argument); Solum, supra note 228, at 1953–80.
253. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (“A student’s privacy interest is limited in
a public school environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and
safety.”).
254. Compare United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (modeling the Fourth
Amendment with the law of property and trespass at common law), with William Baude & James
Y. Stern, A Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1874 (2016)
(advocating for a more flexible positive law model of the Fourth Amendment that “will frequently
be context-specific and even jurisdiction-specific”).
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parentis.255 But originalists might not accept a similar institutional
tailoring by a city park department hosting a hip-hop or rock concert
on the ground that such regulations are insufficiently analogous.
C. Institutions and the Common Law Constitution
Common law constitutionalism is a theory advanced by scholars
like Richard Fallon, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein. To these
scholars, written text is less important than the kind of judge-made
rules that courts use to “implement” the Constitution.256 Common law
constitutionalists recognize text as important, but not primarily
because of its ability to constrain judges. Instead, text serves as a “focal
point” around which policymakers build consensus or coordinate
activity.257 Judges are constrained more by Burkean values of humility,
precedent, judicial minimalism, and tradition than by any independent
fidelity to textual “meaning.”258
To common law constitutionalists, institutions—especially ones
with deep roots in American culture—deserve respect for their
capacity to “meet[] the needs of society through a continuing process
of adaptation” even though their policy prescriptions “may or may not
be consistent with the original intentions of the founders.”259
Institutions like “the family; churches, synagogues and mosques;
charitable associations; civic associations . . . ; labor unions . . . small
businesses, local government units such as . . . town hall meetings, and
political parties” interpose themselves between the state and the

255. See Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1913). Judge Nunn noted that:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare,
and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why to that end they may
not make any rule or regulation for the government, or betterment of their pupils that
a parent could for the same purpose.
Id.
256. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 10 (2001); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 240–41
(2001); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
883–84 (1996).
257. See Strauss, supra note 256, at 910–12.
258. See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 356 (2006); Adrian
Vermeule, Common Law Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482,
1482–85 (2007).
259. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 664 (1994).

MILLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

114

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/21/2016 3:17 PM

[Vol. 66:69

individual as a buffer,260 but they also help mediate normative debates
about textual provisions. As such, they can supply a structure for judges
to fashion constitutional decision rules. For example, “due process”
forms a focal point that is subject to a number of potential meanings;
through the prism of the well-established institution of the family and
the home, the Court has generated a rule that constitutionally protects
contraception.261
In the context of the Second Amendment, institutions have
already done similar work in this common-law-like fashion. The home
is an institution in which courts recognize self-defense and privacy as
being particularly important. It is no wonder, then, that Heller should
repeatedly focus on the special place of the home for self-protection.262
D. Institutions and Popular Constitutionalism
Popular constitutionalism is a theory associated with Larry
Kramer, Mark Tushnet, and sometimes Reva Siegel and Bruce
Ackerman.263 In the popular-constitutionalist model, norm
entrepreneurs generate normative commitments. These normative
commitments give rise to social movements, these social movements
lobby opinion makers in their various guises (for example, legislatures,
executives, courts), and then these opinion makers translate the norms
of social movements directly or indirectly into constitutional law. The
most radical popular constitutionalists do not require the people to
wait for opinion makers, but rather make new constitutional law
themselves—sometimes through the formal Article V process,
sometimes without it.
The product of these social movements can become constitutive
of the nation—consider the abolition of slavery and the civil rights

260. Steven G. Calabresi, Freedom of Expression and the Golden Mean, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1005, 1012 (2014) (identifying this list of mediating institutions).
261. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). Whether this move is a
Burkean cloak for a normative revolution in privacy jurisprudence I leave to others. See Kozel,
supra note 21, at 974 (discussing the relationship between institutionalism and common law
constitutionalism); Llewellyn, supra note 109, at 17 (“[I]nstitutions . . . test whether there is still
force in the Words [of a constitution], and how much force, and what that force is.”).
262. See supra Part V.B. Heller uses the term “home” over twenty-five times in the majority
opinion. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573–636 (2008).
263. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2004).
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movement.264 Although it is also possible the people will swiftly
repudiate the products of popular constitutionalism—consider
Prohibition. Sometimes social movements generate momentum that
other coalitions channel elsewhere. According to one author, the New
Deal was a salutary by-product of the temperance movement’s
overreach.265
Because popular constitutionalism is so oriented toward social
practice, it is heavily dependent upon institutions, even as it works
against other forms of institutional inertia. In this sense, institutions are
as much engines and conduits for constitutional change as they are
impediments. The civil rights revolution likely would never have
overcome Jim Crow without the coordinating functions of the church,
the synagogue, and the NAACP. Nor would Heller have been possible
without the nearly thirty-year effort of the NRA to make its vision of
the Second Amendment the Court’s.266
Distinguishing between varieties of popular constitutionalism is
less about isolating which institutions influence the development of
constitutional law as it is about determining the methods by which they
do so. One can imagine, for example, violent uprisings as a
manifestation of popular constitutionalism (although violent uprisings
may mark the event horizon of any intelligible meaning of
“constitutionalism”). One can also see popular constitutionalism
mediated through other institutions: the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is
the Selma, Alabama marchers’ vision of equal protection and the
Fifteenth Amendment mediated through another institution,
Congress. Similarly, the NRA has translated its vision of the Second
Amendment into gun-rights legislation and “strict scrutiny”

264. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 944, 968
(1997); Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOUS. L.
REV. 393, 445 (2012).
265. See Andrew Koppelman, Left-Evangelicalism and the Constitution, 28 HARV. L. REV. F.
1, 1 (2014) (reviewing JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2014)). Koppelman noted that:
In response to pressure from evangelicals who wanted to ban alcoholic beverages and
gambling, the Court relaxed the preexisting constitutional rules. The consequence was
a growing doctrinal incoherence, with police powers that, once acknowledged, could
not be limited in any sensible way. The New Deal judges were simply amputating
doctrines that had already become gangrenous.
Id.
266. Siegel, supra note 25, at 210–15.
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protections in state constitutions. Their successes are another example
of an institution working to shape constitutional meaning.267
To the extent that states, heavily lobbied by gun-rights
organizations, adopt more gun-friendly provisions in their own
constitutional and subconstitutional law, they potentially affect federal
constitutional law.268 For example, the effort by gun-rights
organizations and gun owners to normalize the carrying of deadly
weapons, either concealed or openly, is an attempt to influence what
the word “bear” means in the Second Amendment.269 More subtly, and
just as importantly, the effort to normalize the bearing of deadly
weapons can influence norms such as what kind of behavior raises a
“reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity under the Fourth
Amendment270 or what kind of bearing constitutes an unlawful
disturbance of the peace.271
E. Institutions and Prudentialism
Even judges who view constitutional theory as tedious (at best) or
toxic (at worst) are likely to look to institutions.272 For prudentialists273
267. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23.
268. The migration of state statutory and constitutional law norms into federal constitutional
law is well documented. For a scholarly account, see Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of
State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 358 (2011).
269. Open Carry FAQ, LOUISIANA OPEN CARRY AWARENESS LEAGUE,
http://www.laopencarry.org/faq.shtml [https:// perma.cc/6YRS-3CAM] (stating that its “main
mission [is] normalizing carry of firearms commonly used in self defense”).
270. See United States v. Robinson, 814 F.3d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Because the carrying
of a concealed firearm is not itself illegal in West Virginia, and because the circumstances did not
otherwise provide an objective basis for inferring danger, we must conclude that the officer who
frisked Robinson lacked reasonable suspicion that Robinson was not only armed but also
dangerous.”), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 13678 (4th Cir. Apr. 25,
2016); United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir. 2014) (Hamilton, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A]s public possession and display of firearms become
lawful under more circumstances, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and police practices must
adapt.”).
271. See Williams, 731 F.3d at 692 (“Wisconsin had amended its disorderly conduct statute to
protect civilians’ rights to possess and even display loaded firearms in public places.”). For more
on these points, see Blocher & Miller, supra note 199, at 320–23.
272. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 7, 10, 21–23 (2012);
Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5–11 (1998). I take these
jurists at their word and place them in this category, well aware that others may place them in one
of a number of different categories already specified.
273. In this subsection, I refer to both Judge Harvie Wilkinson and Judge Richard Posner as
prudentialists, in that they both share a disdain for overarching constitutional theories, well aware
that they may not agree on the depth of each other’s skepticism. See WILKINSON, supra note 272,
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like Judge Wilkinson who prefer Thayerian judicial restraint,
institutions—especially democratically accountable ones—command
deference. However, an institution need not be political to command
respect. Institutional deference may also cut against government
regulation, as shown by Judge Wilkinson’s recent decision striking
down a requirement that abortion providers narrate ultrasound results
to their patients.274
For prudentialists like Judge Richard Posner, who are more
concerned with consequences than with restraint, institutions are
epistemic. As Jerome Frank advocated eighty-four years ago,
institutions can provide pragmatists with information to test, modify,
or discard legal postulates that are spurious, or have become so over
time.275 For example, a prudentialist in the mode of Wilkinson may
defer to the judgment of the medical community as to whether asking
patients about firearms in the home is necessary for the competent
delivery of medical advice.276 A prudentialist like Posner may defer to
criminological consensus to assess whether regulations on gun
possession outside the home further government interests in safety.277
VII. CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONAL
SECOND AMENDMENT
An institutional approach to the Second Amendment may help
resolve a recurrent dilemma in constitutional adjudication: the basic
lack of a common vocabulary as to what the Court is balancing. Current
balancing regimes fall into the rights-discourse trap. What is the
meaning of a “right” if it can be undermined by a sufficiently important

at 80–103 (2012) (identifying Judge Posner with a particular “pragmatic” strand of constitutional
theory); Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 534–
38 (2012) (critiquing the character of Judge Wilkinson’s judicial restraint).
274. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The government’s regulatory
interest is less potent in the context of a self-regulating profession like medicine.”).
275. See Jerome Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking, 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 568, 584–601 (1932).
276. Compare Stuart, 774 F.3d at 248 (“The government’s regulatory interest is less potent in
the context of a self-regulating profession like medicine.”), with Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Fla., 760 F.3d 1195, 1229–30 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding in part a regulation that prohibited
physicians from asking patients about firearms in the home), vacated, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir.
2015), vacated, 814 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated and reh’g granted, No. 12–14009, 2016 WL
2959373 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2016).
277. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012).
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government “interest”?278 In one sense, if one thinks of an
“infringement” not as a violation, but as any diminution, then
balancing is the very definition of an “infringement.”279
Understanding the Second Amendment in an institutional
context, however, situates the balancing not as between personal,
atomized moral claims versus government interests, but as the judicial
management of a set of institutional arrangements either specified at
the Founding (for originalists), recognized as traditional (for the
Burkeans), or developed over time (for the dynamic
constitutionalists).280 Elsewhere I have briefly explored the
mechanisms by which the judiciary may maintain this set of
arrangements.281 But for my purposes, whether the Court continues to
use balancing, history, tradition, or some mix of tests is less important
than whether courts acknowledge that institutions exist in Second
Amendment adjudication and begin to build the doctrine that
translates those institutions into law. The pride (if not the practice) of
institutional blindness in the First Amendment should not be
reproduced in the Second.
An institutional approach to the Second Amendment could also
help address the frequent allegation that judges treat the right to keep
and bear arms as a second-class right.282 Second Amendment advocates
often leverage First Amendment doctrine to ratchet Second
Amendment protections to stratospheric heights. It is commonplace to
hear advocates argue that judges should treat the Second Amendment
and First Amendment identically, and that judges should forbid prior
restraints, overbreadth, or content discrimination when it comes to

278. For a discussion of this problem, see Pildes, supra note 110, at 733 (“What does it mean
to ‘balance’ seemingly incommensurable entities, such as rights and social welfare?”); Heller v.
District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
279. But see Blocher & Miller, supra note 199, at 334 (casting doubt on the meaning of the
word “infringement” as “diminution”).
280. See Pildes, supra note 110, at 744 (“[R]ights are vehicles not for atomistic, self-regarding
interests of the right holders but for protecting collective interests and structural concerns.”).
281. See generally Miller, supra note 72 (exploring the mechanisms through which the
judiciary maintains the scope and role of the civil jury with procedural innovations).
282. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (mem.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent the Seventh Circuit
from relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”).
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firearms, just as they do with speech.283 When judges balk at such
proposals, they are attacked for having privileged some constitutional
rights over others.284
Institutional sensitivity blunts this criticism by recognizing that
institutions—whether sourced in text, common law, history, tradition,
or evolving consensus—shape some constitutional rights differently
than others. No constitutional right is absolute, but constitutional rights
may be “not absolute” in different ways.285 Some constitutional rights,
because of their text, history, tradition, or consequence, are more
amenable to institutional tailoring than others. The Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is one such right, as this
Article has attempted to show.

283. See Magarian, supra note 122, at 69 (criticizing these arguments); Amy Davidson,
Feinstein and Cruz Fight About Guns, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/
news/amy-davidson/feinstein-and-cruz-fight-about-guns [https://perma.cc/J27J-QLCU].
284. Cf. BERLIN, supra note 107, at 169 (“The necessity of choosing between absolute claims
is . . . an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”).
285. See Pildes, supra note 110, at 734 (observing that rights are about constraining
government reasons for action, which may differ based on the “common goods that those rights
are meant to realize”).

